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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner

:

and Cross-Respondent,

Case No. 910218
Ct. of App. No. 890463-CA

v.
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Petitioner. :

Category No. 13

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals for review of State v. Sims, 808
P.2d 141 (Utah App.)/ cert, granted,

P.2d

(a copy of which is attached as an addendum).

(Utah 1993)
This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that

the roadblock stop of defendant was per se unconstitutional under
the Utah Constitution because it was not expressly authorized by
statute?
Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question
of law; thus, this Court reviews the court of appeals' legal
conclusion without deference.

See City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 841
(1990) .
2.

Did the court of appeals properly apply this

Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in
holding that defendant's consent to search was not valid and that
the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to his consent was
therefore not admissible?
This also presents a question of law, and therefore the
Court owes no deference to the court of appeals' application of
Arroyo.

See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah

1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i)
(Supp, 1988) (R. 7).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
the contraband seized from his car by the police during a
roadblock stop (R. 12, 22-56).

An evidentiary hearing
2

established that defendant was stopped, along with numerous other
vehicles, at a roadblock set up by the police for the purpose of
"detect[ing] driver's license, automobile registration, and
equipment violations, as well as liquor and drug violations."
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 142 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted,
P.2d

(Utah 1993).

After being stopped at the

roadblock, defendant consented to a search of his vehicle,
including the trunk, which revealed small amounts of marijuana
and a kilogram brick of cocaine.

Ibid.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress,
ruling that "(1) the roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or
federal constitutions; (2) [defendant] voluntarily consented to
the search of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3) [the
officer who conducted the search] had probable cause to continue
searching the trunk after [defendant]'s withdrawal of consent."
Id. at 143.
Subsequently, defendant was convicted of the charged
offense after a bench trial based on stipulated facts (R. 14245).

The court sentenced him to a term of one to fifteen years

at the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay a fine of $1,250
and an additional $312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund (Id.).
The court then suspended the prison term and placed defendant on
eighteen months' probation (Id.K
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal

3

and state constitutions/ and therefore the contraband seized from
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed.
The court of appeals held that the roadblock violated the Fourth
Amendment under Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990)/ and that it also violated article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution because the roadblock was not expressly
authorized by statute.

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 145-50.

It

further held that, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990)/ defendant's consent to the search of his vehicle was not
sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid
the taint of that initial illegality/ and therefore the consent
was invalid.

Id. at 150-52.

This Court granted certiorari.

State v. Sims, No.

910218 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court accurately summarized the facts of this case
in a related tax case involving the same defendant and the same
incident:
On July 27/ 1988/ the Utah Highway Patrol
and the Juab County Sheriff's Department set
up a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15
approximately two miles outside of Nephi/
Utah. When Sims' car was stopped at the
roadblock, the officers observed an open
container of alcohol in the back seat area.
Sims was asked to exit the car, at which time
he consented to a search of the interior.
There, the officers discovered the remnants
of one or two marijuana cigarettes. Sims
then consented to a search of the trunk.
When the latter search revealed two small
plastic bags containing marijuana, Sims
stated that he wanted the search stopped.
Asserting that they had probable cause to
continue, the officers inspected the spare
tire well, uncovering a kilogram brick of
-4-

cocaine. Sims was then arrested for driving
unde. he influence of alcohol and possession
of a ..ntrolled substance with intent to
distr-; "e.
Sims v. State Ta.

nm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1992).

The

roadblock was set wt "to detect driver's license, vehicle
registration, and equipment violations, as well as liquor and
drug violations."

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 142.x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Although the court of appeals correctly ruled that the
roadblock in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, it
erroneously concluded that the roadblock was per se
tkrsder the. s-fca+e, cons+i+u+iow

unconstitutional because it was not expressly authorized by
statute.

The better reasoned view is that the police had implied

statutory authority to set up the roadblock and the absence of
express statutory authority did not render the device per se
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, express
statutory authorization is not a prerequisite to a determination
that a particular law enforcement practice is constitutional.
Because the court of appeals' novel state constitutional holding
has far reaching implications for Utah's search and seizure law,
this Court should reverse that holding.
The court of appeals' additional holding that
defendant's consent to the search of his car was not valid under
1

Specifically, one of the supervising officers "instructed
officers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle registration of
the stopped motorists; while doing this, they were to watch for
signs of liquor and drug violations." Sims, 808 P.2d at 14 3.
-5-

the exploitation prong of the test set forth in State v. Arrovo,
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), is inconsistent with this Court's
clarification of the Arrovo test in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1993).

This Court's similar holding in Sims v. State

Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). is also ittCoKsigfeK^f u/i"B» *~fhnrh*cLn
Because the roadblock stop of defendant did not
constitute flagrant or purposeful police misconduct, the absence
of a significant time period or intervening circumstances between
the illegal stop and defendant's consent to search is not
critical.

In short, under Thurman's analysis of Arrovo's

exploitation prong, defendant's consent was not obtained through
exploitation of the illegal stop.

That consent was valid, and

therefore the evidence seized either directly or indirectly
pursuant to the consent was admissible.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of
appeals' contrary holding and overrule its own contrary holding
in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE ROADBLOCK WAS PER SE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EXPRESS STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATION FOR ROADBLOCKS
After the court of appeals ruled that the roadblock in
this case violated the Fourth Amendment under Sitz, a ruling the
State does not challenge, it then held that the roadblock was per
se unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution because there was no express statutory authority for
-6-

such roadblocks.

Sims, 808 P.2d at 149. The court did not

resolve the question of whether the officers had implied
authority to conduct the roadblock, even though it appears that
authority could be inferred from the statutes that pertain to the
general authority of law enforcement officers.

See Utah Code

Ann. §§ 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1992), 17-22-2 (1991), 27-10-4(a) &
(b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988).

But see Sims v. State Tax Comm'n,

841 P.2d at 9 (where two Justices "decline to infer authority for
suspicionless investigatory stops from broad statutory
directives").
Although the legislature has since enacted statutes
authorizing roadblocks of the type used in this case, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23-101 through -105 (Supp. 1992), this Court should
nevertheless review the court of appeals' novel interpretation of
the state constitution.

The court of appeals' holding amounts to

a broad conclusion that certain warrantless law enforcement
techniques require express legislative authorization before they
can be constitutional under the Utah Constitution.

Left intact,

this conclusion has the potential to fundamentally alter the law
of search and seizure in this state.
In holding that the roadblock here violated the state
constitution, the court of appeals reasoned that this Court's
emphasis on the warrant requirement under article I, section 14,
coupled with the legislature's independent action in authorizing
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints, required that the
legislature expressly authorize suspicionless, investigatory
roadblocks before they could be constitutional under the state
-7-

constitution.

Sims, 808 P.2d at 148-49-

The court made the

rather remarkable observation that "in authorizing [ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints], our legislature has,
presumably, weighed the need for such suspicionless inspections
against their intrusion upon individual liberty, a

analogous
warrant."

to that performed by a magistrate

process

in the issuance

of a

Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
The fundamental flaw in this latter statement is that

when considering an application for a warrant, a magistrate is
concerned only with whether there is probable cause; he or she
does not engage in weighing the need for a warrant against the
intrusion upon individual liberty.

A warrant and the attendant

intrusion upon an individual's liberty are constitutional if
supported by probable cause; the magistrate's determination of
whether a search is constitutionally justified does not go beyond
the probable cause determination.
The legislature, on the other hand, while obviously
concerned with the constitutionality of its enactments, does not
determine the constitutionality of a particular police practice.
Although it may prohibit certain police practices that the courts
consider constitutional, such a statutory prohibition does not
render the police practice unconstitutional; rather, the practice
is merely illegal —

that is, prohibited by statute. Likewise,

the legislature does not render a police practice constitutional
simply because it authorizes the practice by statute.

Nor is

there any logical basis for the proposition that legislative
approval is a prerequisite to a judicial determination that a
-8-

certain police conduct is constitutional.
In short, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded
that the legislature performs a judicial function, akin to that
of a magistrate or an appellate court, in determining the
constitutionality of a particular police practice.
P.2d at 152 (Orme, J., concurring specially).

See Sims, 808

Whether police

conduct is constitutional is ultimately a question for the
courts, not the legislature.
Although the court of appeals finds support for its
novel view in Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692
(1987), and State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 1984)2, the
better reasoned position is that adopted by the Appellate Court
of Illinois in a case upholding a vehicle safety equipment
checkpoint:
Criminal statutes do contain an implied
right of police to enforce them. While there
are state and federal constitutional
limitations on the means of enforcement,
these limits are constitutional and not
inherent in every criminal statute. The
State has passed laws requiring safety
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary
intent, the police should be able to enforce
those laws in a constitutional manner.
. . . .

We are loath to say that the State has
anything but a strong interest in seeing that
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the
2

The court of appeals also cited State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of its position.
That case is distinguishable from Nelson and Smith, in that the
Idaho Legislature had explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to
situations where officers desired to "apprehend[J persons

reasonably believed

by such officers

to be wanted for a

violation

of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United
States[.]•• Id. at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-621).
-9-

absence of any intent to provide otherwise,
the safety equipment statutes carry with them
an implied right of the officers to inspect
autos in any constitutional manner.
People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-34,
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).

Other courts have concluded

that roadblocks are constitutional in the absence of explicit
statutory authority.

Davis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 843 P.2d

260 (Kan. 1992); Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo. 1990);
Inaersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1318 (Cal. 1987).
There are numerous law enforcement practices involving
suspicionless and warrantless searches or seizures which this
Court has recognized as constitutionally permissible and
otherwise proper even though there is no explicit statutory
authority.

For example, there is no explicit statutory authority

for searches incident to arrest or inventory searches, both of
which may be conducted without suspicion or a warrant.

See,

e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986)
(recognizing search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements); State v.
Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that suspicionless
and warrantless inventory searches are permitted under the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution).
The court of appeals' state constitutional analysis casts doubt
on the propriety of these police practices.
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, the
appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any law enforcement
practice is to ask whether it is constitutional, not whether it
is explicitly authorized by statute. While the particular
-10-

practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a

-fo
peace officer, explicit authority is not required for it^be
constitutional.
In Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, Justice Durham's lead
opinion, in which only Justice Zimmerman joined, essentially
adopted all of the court of appeals' reasoning in State v. Sims
concerning the requirement of explicit statutory authority for
roadblocks before they could be constitutional under article I,
section 14.

841 P.2d at 8-9.

Relying heavily on the "court's

commitment to the warrant approach under our state constitution,"
as expressed in the two Justice lead opinion in State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman,
J.), Justice Durham concluded that "as a matter of law, the
roadblock stop [of defendant] was unconstitutional under the Utah
Constitution."

Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 8.

Suspicionless, investigatory roadblocks were neither implicitly
nor explicitly authorized by statute.

Id. at 9.

Furthermore,

neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances supported the
warrantless roadblock at which defendant was stopped.

Id. at 8-

9Justice Durham's analysis was specifically limited to a
"suspicionless, investigatory, nonemergency roadblock," and did
not extend to "emergency roadblocks that might be used, for
example, to apprehend a fleeing felon," "any existing authority
to conduct roadblocks for traffic control purposes," or "port of
entry or fish and game roadblocks conducted pursuant to statute."
Id. at 8 n.3.
-11-

However, concurring in the result, Justice Stewart
severely criticized Justice Durham, observing that "her sweeping
opinion represents the views of only two justices of this Court
and is therefore not the law of the state."
J., concurring in result)3.

Id. at 15 (Stewart,

He also noted that "her opinion

raises more difficult issues than it settles with respect to the
legality of roadblocks."

Ibid.

Specifically, Justice Stewart concluded that the
roadblock was clearly unconstitutional under federal law,
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and
thus Justice Durham's conclusion that the roadblock violated the
Utah Constitution is dictum.

He further suggested that Justice

Durham's opinion "would make all preplanned, suspicionless
roadblocks illegal, including roadblocks intended to remove
intoxicated drivers from the highways or to enforce automobile
safety measures."

Id. at 16.

Thus, the lead opinion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n does
not represent the view of a majority of this Court.

Insofar as

that opinion endorses the court of appeals' view that a roadblock
is per se unconstitutional under the state constitution unless
there is express legislative authorization for the roadblock, it
should be rejected.

As previously argued, explicit legislative

authorization is not a prerequisite to a determination that
certain warrantless law enforcement activity is constitutional.

3

Associate Chief Justice Howe, joined by the Chief Justice,
dissented on the ground that the exclusionary rule should not
apply in a proceeding before the Tax Commission. 841 P.2d at 1621 (Howe, A.C.J., dissenting).
-12-

To summarize, the notion that certain law enforcement
techniques must have explicit legislative authorization before
they can be constitutional under the state constitution
erroneously places in the hands of the legislature the primary
role of declaring the constitutionality of police conduct.
Ultimate questions concerning the constitutionality of government
action are reserved for the courts, not the legislature*
Therefore, the Court should reverse the court of appeals' state
constitutional holding on the ground that the absence of express
statutory authorization for a particular law enforcement practice
does not render that practice per se unconstitutional under
article I, section 14.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' APPLICATION OF STATE V.
ARROYO AND THIS COURT'S APPLICATION OF ARROYO
TO THE SAME DEFENDANT AND THE SAME FACTS IN
SIMS V. STATE TAX COMM'N ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN STATE V.
THURMAN
The court of appeals held that defendant's consent to
the search of his car lacked attenuation from the initial,
illegal roadblock stop, and therefore the evidence seized
pursuant to that consent was inadmissible under State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).

A majority of this Court reached the

same conclusion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 10
(Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.)/ 15 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the result), a drug stamp tax case involving this
defendant and the same incident.

Thus, the Court has resolved

the exclusion issue against the State.

However, the Court may

wish to reexamine that issue because the Court's holding is at
-13-

odds with the attenuation analysis set forth in State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).
A.

Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman

In Arroyo, the Court "held that a defendant's consent
to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met:
(i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was
not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality."
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688). In
Thurman, the Court clarified how the exploitation (attenuation)
prong of the Arroyo test is to be applied.
Thurman began by stating that "Arroyo's primary goal
was to deter the police from engaging in illegal conduct even
though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the
subsequent search."

846 P.2d at 1263. Having identified the

deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule as the basis for
Arroyo's exploitation prong, the Court reiterated the factors to
be considered in assessing the validity of a consent to search
that follows illegal police conduct:

"[(1)] 'the purpose and

flagrancy of the official misconduct,' [(2)] the 'temporal
proximity' of the illegality and the consent, and [(3)] 'the
presence of intervening circumstances.'"
omitted).

Ibid, (citations

The Court then discussed each factor, emphasizing the

deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
The Court made clear that the "purpose and flagrancy"
factor is the most significant of the three because it "directly
relates to the deterrent value of suppression."
-14-

Ibid, (citations

omitted).

Therefore, the first task under the exploitation prong

is to determine the nature and degree of the police illegality
based on a continuum of "flagrancy" or "purpose."
To put the continuum in perspective, it must first be
recognized that "'[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right.'"

Ibid, (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422

U.S. 590, 612 (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).

Thus, at one end of the

continuum is police misconduct that is "flagrantly abusive, [such
that] there is greater likelihood that the police engaged in the
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives," or instances
where "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the consent."
Id. (citations omitted).

In such cases, "suppressing the

resulting evidence will have a greater likelihood of deterring
similar misconduct in the future."

Ibid, (citation and footnote

omitted).
At the other extreme are instances where "the police
had no 'purpose' in engaging in the misconduct[.]

[F]or example,

if the illegality arose because [a court] later invalidated a
statute on which the police had relied in good faith[,]
suppression would have no deterrent value."

Ibid, (citations

omitted).
With this continuum in mind, Thurman then described the
relationship between the flagrancy factor and the other two
factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances.
-15-

Specifically, "the exploitation analysis requires a balancing of
the relative

egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and

circumstances that intervene before the consent is given."
(emphasis added).

Ibid.

The Court explained:

The nature and degree of the illegality will
usually be inversely related to the
effectiveness of time and intervening events
to dissipate the presumed taint. Where the
misconduct is extreme, we will require a
clean break in the chain of events between
the misconduct and the consent to find the
consent valid. . . . Conversely, where it
appears that the illegality arose as the
result of negligence, the lapse of time
between the misconduct and the consent and
the presence of intervening events become
less critical to the dissipation of the
taint.
Ibid, (citation omitted).
Thurman's clarification of how the nature and degree of
the illegality are balanced against the intervening time and
circumstances stands in marked contrast to this Court's and the
court of appeals' application of the exploitation prong to the
facts of the instant case. At the time the roadblock was set up,
no decision from either the Utah appellate courts or the United
States Supreme Court had directly ruled on the legality of such
roadblocks.

See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at 142-50.

In fact,

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that police
roadblocks for the purpose of checking driver's license and
vehicle registration were constitutional.

United States v.

Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 486
U.S. 1054 (1988).

It was not until Sitz, State v. Sims, and Sims

v. State Tax Comm'n were issued that it became clear the
roadblock at issue here was unconstitutional under the Fourth
-16-

Amendment and article I, section 14. Thus, the roadblock could
not fairly be characterized as a flagrant violation of the
federal or state constitution.
While it is not clear that the Sims panel actually
concluded that the police misconduct was flagrant, it seemed to
suggest that the roadblock constituted a flagrant constitutional
violation because (1) "[t]he troopers each had years of law
enforcement experience, and [could] properly be charged with
awareness that their action was not authorized by law," and (2)
11

[u]sing ten to twelve law officers to staff the roadblock may

have left distant parts of the largely rural jurisdiction with
delayed police assistance in the event of need."

808 P.2d at

151.
As noted, no state or federal decision on the books at
the time of the roadblock in this case would have made clear to
the officers that it was unconstitutional.

To require of the

officers the clairvoyance necessary to anticipate Sitz and the
court of appeals' unique state constitutional holding is
unreasonable.

Furthermore, the court of appeals' criticism of

the use of law enforcement resources, beyond being speculative
and outside any particular expertise of the judiciary, does not
form a basis for concluding that the officers were guilty of a
flagrant or purposeful constitutional

violation.

In concluding that the defendant's "consent to search
his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal
roadblock," the court of appeals relied most heavily on two
factors:

(1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of the
-17-

illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between
the two"; and (2) "the record reveal[ed] no possibility of
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and the grant
of consent to the search."

Sims, 808 P.2d at 150-51.

Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation
prong, it was not unreasonable for the court of appeals to
interpret Arroyo as requiring a clean break in the chain of
events between a prior police illegality (whether or not
flagrant) and the subsequent consent for the consent to be valid.
However, Thurman clearly rejected this approach.
It is not clear why in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, which
was issued less than three months before Thurman, the Court did
not apply Thurman's analysis.
to the flagrancy factor:

It simply devoted but one sentence

"The purpose of the roadblock was to

obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose that does
nothing to reduce the 'flagrancy' of the constitutional violation
it precipitated."

Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 10. The

Court never explained why the roadblock constituted a "flagrant"
violation in the first place, given that there was at least one
decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that apparently
approved such roadblocks and no decision from a Utah appellate
court or the United States Supreme Court holding such roadblocks
unconstitutional.
Insofar as the court of appeals held that a consent
search is automatically invalidated if the voluntary consent is
-18-

closely connected in time and by circumstance to the prior police
illegality, it is wrong.

The same is true of this Court's

similar holding in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n.

As Thurman makes

clear, if the violation by the police is not flagrant or
purposeful, temporal proximity or the absence of intervening
circumstances between the illegality and the consent is not
significant.
In sum, police exploitation of the illegal roadblock
stop is not made out in this case.

The court of appeals' and

this Court's conclusion to the contrary is simply inconsistent
with Thurman.

In that defendant does not challenge the

voluntariness of his consent, Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d
at 9 n.8, that consent was valid under the Arroyo two-part test
as clarified by Thurman.

Thus, the incriminating evidence, which

was obtained either directly or indirectly pursuant to that
consent*, was admissible.
by excluding the evidence.

No deterrent purpose would be served
Accordingly, the court of appeals'

contrary holding should be reversed and this Court's contrary
holding in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should

* Once defendant had withdrawn his consent for the search of
the trunk, the searching officer, who by then had discovered two
small bags of marijuana in the trunk, obviously had probable
cause to continue his search under the automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See State v. Dorsev,
731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (discussing the automobile
exception).
-19-

reverse the court of appeals and affirm defendant's conviction,
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

lp&

day of May, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

V^DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Louie Edwin SIMS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890463-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 15, 1991.
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Juab County, George E.
Ballif, J., of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value,
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that (1) roadblock at
which defendant's vehicle was stopped violated both Fourth Amendment and Utah
Constitution, and (2) defendant's consent to
search his vehicle, made after vehicle was
stopped at illegal roadblock, was arrived at
by exploitation of roadblock, and was invalid.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, J., filed specially concurring
opinion.
1. Criminal Law «»1031(1)
Issue of whether roadblock conducted
by police violated Federal and State Constitutions was properly preserved for appeal,
although State admitted that roadblock
was unconstitutional for sake of argument,
where defendant argued unconstitutionality of roadblock throughout proceeding and
there was ample factual record from which
issue could be assessed. Const Art 1,
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures c=»18
Roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is
"seizure" under Fourth Amendment and
Utah Constitution. Const Art 1, § 14;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Searches and Seizures *»60
Utah statutes governing vehicle inspections, regulation of traffic, and stops

based on reasonable suspicion did not apply
in determining whether suspicionless investigatory roadblocks were permissible.
Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 4, 14; U.C.A.1953, 23-20-19, 2710-4(lXb), 27-12-19, 41-l-17(c), 77-7-15.
4. Searches and Seizures «»60
Suspicionless, investigatory roadblock
in which vehicles and drivers were screened
for possible violations of law violated
Fourth Amendment; no explicit plan, beyond determination that all vehicles other
than large trucks were to be stopped, governed roadblock, officers who authorized
roadblock were not politically accountable
officials, and there was no indication that
authorization process involved balancing
Fourth Amendment interests and law enforcement interest or assessment of effectiveness of roadblock in meeting those interests. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Searches and Seizures *»11, 23
Fourth Amendment balancing test applies to warrantless seizures that, if not
based upon articulable suspicion of individual, must be carried out pursuant to plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
conduct of individual officers; additionally,
such plan should be developed by politically
accountable officials with unique understanding of and responsibility for, limited
public resources, including finite number of
police officers. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures $»60
Politically accountable officials, not the
courts, are responsible for performing initial balancing between Fourth Amendment
and interests served by plan authorizing
roadblock. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures «=*60
Suspicionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, are per se unconstitutional under search and seizure provision of
Utah Constitution. Const Art 1, § 14.
8. Criminal Law «=>394.6(2)
Unless ground for suppression is unknown or unavailable to defendant at time
suppression motion is filed, right to challenge admission of evidence on that ground
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U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Re-

9. Criminal Law *=>1031(1)
Defendant's failure to argue at trial
that there was insufficient attenuation between his consent to search of his automobile and initial illegal stop of vehicle at
roadblock did not preclude consideration of
issue on appeal, where, because of thenstanding decisions effectively holding that
noncoerced consent to search, by itself,
purged the taint of primary illegality,
nonattenuation argument was unavailable
at trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Repealed).
10. Searches and Seizures *»184
Defendant's consent to search of his
vehicle, made after vehicle was stopped at
illegal roadblock, was arrived at by exploitation of roadblock, and was invalid; consent was obtained within minutes of illegal
stop, and defendant did not spontaneously
volunteer his consent. Const. Art 1, § 14;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
G. Fred Metos (Argued), Yengich, Rich,
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R.
Larsen (Argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction
of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value, Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8<l)(aXi) (Supp.1988), a
second degree felony. Sims claims the
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing State v. Arroyo, 770 ?2d 153 (Utah Ct.
App.1989)); State v. Earl 716 ?2d 803 (Utah
1986); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct.
App.1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). See also United States v. Corral,
899 FJd 991 (10th Cir.1990). Besides the
present case, at least one other case involving
an automobile search by Sergeant Mangelson is

stop of his vehicle in a roadblock conducted
by the Utah Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Following oral argument, three cases relevant to the issues presented in this appeal
were decided. Those cases are Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S.
,
110 S.Ct 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990);
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990);
and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' motion for supplemental briefing. Having
considered the supplemental briefs, we now
reverse his conviction, and remand for a
new trial in which evidence Beized from
Sims' vehicle is to be suppressed.
FACTS
On the morning of July 27,1988, officers
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab
County Sheriffs Office conducted a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately two miles south of Nephi, Utah.
The roadblock was planned and supervised
by Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul
Mangelson.1 Its purpose was to detect
driver's license, automobile registration,
and equipment violations, as well as liquor
and drug violations. Notice that the roadblock would take place was published in the
Juab County Times News two to four
weeks prior to the roadblock. There was
no evidence that the News was distributed
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a
major north-south route and link between
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, California.
According to Mangelson, no written policy, from the Highway Patrol or from any
pending in this court State v. Kitchen, No.
900307-CA. As a central player in at least five
published search and seizure scenarios to date,
the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics detection dog
whose nose for crime has figured in at least
seven published federal cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer,
878 R2d 469, 471 and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989), and
cases cited therein.
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other source, existed to guide the conduct
of the roadblock in question. Mangelson
indicated that his supervising lieutenant
had given him permission to conduct the
roadblock.
The roadblock was staffed by about ten
uniformed officers. A series of three signs
within a one-half mile distance directed
drivers to the roadblock, r^rked by orange
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because stopping them might cause hazardous traffic congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed officers to inspect driver's
licenses and vehicle registration of the
stopped motorists; while doing this, they
were to watch for signs of liquor and drug
violations. Officers could hold vehicles for
further investigation if the initial contact
raised questions. One of the officers,
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his
practice also included asking ail drivers,
regardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol,
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle, a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the
roadblock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to contact Sims, saw nothing to cause
him to suspect a violation of the law as
Sims' vehicle approached.8 Howard asked
for Sims' driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims produced a valid Georgia
driver's license and a Utah registration in
his name. In response to the trooper's
question, Sims stated that he was en route
from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City. While
talking with Sims, Trooper Howard smelled
alcohol inside the sedan and saw an "open"
liquor bottle in the back seat area. He
asked Sims if there were any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admitted
that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but
denied carrying drugs or weapons.
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to
this question could prompt Trooper Howard to
then seek consent to search automobiles without any other suspicion of wrongdoing:
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity, did
anybody answer "yes" [to query about alcohol, weapons, or contraband] when every,
thing appeared in order so you would have to
conduct a further search?

Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan, and asked for consent to look inside.
Sims consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached and helped Howard search the
car's interior. They discovered the remnants of one or two marijuana cigarettes in
the right rear passenger door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he would mind if
they searched the trunk of the sedan.
Sims agreed and opened the trunk. Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby.
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson
discovered two small plastic bags containing marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly
nervous, then stated that he wanted the
search stopped. Mangelson told Sims that,
based on the discovery of marijuana, he
had probable cause to continue searching
the trunk. Looking in the spare tire well,
Mangelson found a kilogram brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and possession of a controlled substance.
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his vehicle,
contending that the roadblock stop was an
unlawful seizure under the Utah and federal constitutions and that the officers lacked
probable cause to search the trunk. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied Sims' motion. The court determined that (1) the roadblock stop did not
violate the Utah or federal constitutions;
(2) Sims voluntarily consented to the search
of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3)
Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to
continue searching the trunk after Sims'
withdrawal of consent. Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
and on the parties' written stipulation to
the evidence, the trial court found Sims
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had several
people do that.
3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by
defense counsel included the following exchange:
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] was
doing anything wrong as he entered the roadblock or breaking any law; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
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guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
ISSUES
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadblock stop of his vehicle violated his right
to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures under article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution;
and (2) there was insufficient attenuation
between the unlawful detention and any
consent to overcome the illegality of the
roadblock.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ROADBLOCK
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely
with the permissibility of the roadblock itself. Because it is undisputed that the
roadblock was conducted with neither a
warrant nor suspicion of wrongdoing by
Sims, and that no emergency situation necessitated it, the question of whether the
roadblock was improper is reduced to one
of law, and we review it without deference
to the trial court. Scharf i>. BUG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); State v.
Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah CtApp.
1989).
The State neither contests nor accepts
Sims' arguments that the roadblock violated the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the
State invites us to decide this case solely on
the basis of the attenuation issue. That is,
we are to "assum[e] arguendo that the stop
was illegal," and remand this case for fact
finding on whether Sims' consent to search
his vehicle was obtained through exploitation of the stop.
[1] We believe it inappropriate in this
case, however, to simply assume that the
roadblock was unconstitutional, without
analysis. Sims has steadfastly and thor4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional
concerns in his argument, Sims has answered
calls by Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional analysis of search and seizure issues.
See, e.g„ Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06; State v.

oughly argued the unconstitutionality of
the roadblock, on both federal and state
grounds, throughout these proceedings.4
The transcript of the suppression hearing
and the trial court's written findings on the
issue provide an ample factual record from
which we can assess the constitutionality
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore,
has been properly preserved and squarely
presented on appeal.
We are aware of the rule that we should
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so. State v. Anderson,
701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This
roadblock, however, was not an isolated
incident, and our police may continue to use
suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This makes all Utah motorists
subject to closer police scrutiny than they
might expect or, arguably, be legitimately
required to encounter.
[2] The right of citizens to be secure
from unreasonable seizures "shall not be
violated/* U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah
Const art I, § 14 (emphasis added). A
roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is a seizure under the fourth amendment, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S.
, 110 S.Ct 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah CtApp. 1990); there is no reason to
hold otherwise with respect to our state
constitution. For the benefit of our citizens, as well as that of police charged with
enforcing our laws, it behooves us to decide
whether the roadblock that netted Sims
was constitutionally permissible. We hold
that it was not.
Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadblocks.
13] A prelude to the constitutional
analysis per se is a determination of whether any statutory authority either permits or
prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted
here, that is, a suspicionless, investigatory
roadblock in which vehicles and drivers are
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.
1988) (citing cases).
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 ?2d 489 (Utah
CtApp.1990).
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screened for possible violations of law.6
We note several statutes of interest, but
none apply here.
The Utah Department of Transportation
operates ports of entry at which all large
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock
are stopped and inspected for, among other
things, driver qualifications, registration,
tax payments, size and weight, and safety.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19 (Supp.1990).
Our fish and game laws give the Division
of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks
or game checking stations under Utah
Code Ann. § 23-20-19 (1984), which makes
it unlawful to fail to stop at such stations.
These provisions are obviously inapplicable
here.
We also note that the Utah Highway
Patrol is charged with the duty of "regulat[ing] traffic on all highways and roads
of the state."
Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-10-4(lXb) (1989). This provision
might authorize roadblock-type operations
at, for example, accident scenes, or where
hazardous road or traffic conditions require
extra control. However, because this section in no way implies authority to conduct
investigatory operations, it does not apply
here.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) allows
a peace officer to "stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his
actions."7 Similarly, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-l-17(c) (1988) requires officers to stop
a vehicle for driver's license, registration,
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock,
it does not fit into the traditional "three levels"
of police stops, that have been described as
follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at [any
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however,
the "detention must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is
being committed.

and general inspection upon reasonable
belief that any vehicle is being operated in
violation of any provision of this act or of
any other law regulating the operation of
vehicles
" These codifications of the
familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were clearly not enacted with roadblock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to the singling out of particular individuals or vehicles by the police,
based on particularized suspicion.
We find nothing in the Utah code that
specifically prohibits the roadblock that
was conducted here, however. Therefore,
we query whether the roadblock was constitutionally prohibited.
Fourth

Amendment

14] In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 99 S.Ct 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court implied
that roadblock stops for the purpose of
checking driver's licenses and vehicle registrations might be constitutionally permitted. Holding that a routine stop of an
individual vehicle for such purpose, without
articulable individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing, was impermissible under the
fourth amendment, the Court commented
that "[t]his holding does not preclude the
State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
J 987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.
Merrill, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), cert,
denied, 476 VS. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d
696 (1986)). The level of individualized suspicion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one
stop. However, since drivers were required to
stop and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the roadblock stop went well beyond a
level one encounter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or three stop, since no individualized suspicion prompted the stop.
7. This provision has been characterized as a
legislatively enacted version of the so-called level two stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
541 (Utah CuApp.1990); note 6 supra.
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The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears,
and in Sitz, the Court considered an investigatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint,"
operated by the Michigan State Police Department. The checkpoint was operated
under guidelines created by a special state
advisory committee composed of law enforcement officials and transportation researchers from the University of Michigan.
Those guidelines governed checkpoint publicity, site selection, and police procedure at
the checkpoint itself. Sitz, 110 S.Ct at
2483-84.
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling through the checkpoint were stopped
and briefly checked for intoxication. Only
if the initial examination revealed signs of
intoxication would a motorist would be directed out of the traffic flow for a driver's
license and registration check and further
sobriety tests. The Sitz checkpoint was
maintained for one hour and fifteen minutes. During that time, 126 vehicles were
stopped for an average of twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint yielded two arrests—approximately one and one-half percent of stopped drivers—for driving under
the influence. Id. at 2484.
Utilizing a balancing test developed in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116
(1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99
S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Supreme Court held that Michigan's sobriety
checkpoint passed fourth amendment muster. The brief detention of motorists at the
checkpoint was found to be only a "slight"
infringement of their fourth amendment
interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 2486. Outweighing this infringement were "the magnitude of the drunken driving problem
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it,"
id. at 2485, along with the Court's assessment that the one and one-half percent
drunk driver arrest rate demonstrated that
the checkpoint adequately advanced that
interest. Id. at 2487-88; see also Brown,
443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct at 2640 and
cases cited therein (permissibility of non-arS. The court's definition of the public interest
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking, appears to be contrary to testimony about
the generalized purposes of the roadblock.

rest seizure requires weighing public interest served thereby, degree to which it
serves the interest, and severity of interference with individual liberty).
According to the testimony of Sergeant
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadblock in the present case was of an "allpurpose" variety. All vehicles except
trucks were checked for licenses, registration, equipment problems, driver sobriety,
and signs of illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The trial court, focusing on the last purpose, performed a
balancing test as described above. It held
that "a history of escalating drug traffic
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a
result of other arrests, tends to legitimize
the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers
to minimize the burden to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random roving stops."8 Without passing
judgment on the accuracy of the trial
court's balancing, we believe that analysis
was premature and therefore erroneous.
15,6] As we read Sitz, MartinezFuerte, and Brown, a fourth amendment
balancing test applies to warrantless seizures that, if not based upon articulable
suspicion of an individual, "must be carried
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99
S.Ct at 2640 (emphasis added). Additionally, such a plan should be developed by
"politically accountable officials" with a
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers."
Sitz, 110 S.Ct at 2487. Those officials, and
not the courts, are responsible iOT performing the initial balancing between the fourth
amendment and the interests served by the
plan. Id. While the Sitz sobriety checkpoint met these requirements, the roadblock used here did not
No explicit plan, beyond a determination
that all vehicles other than large trucks
There was no finding as to the actual efficacy of
the roadblock in meeting the public purposes
described by the officers or the more specific
purposes identified by the court.
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were to be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor does it appear that Sergeant
Mangelson or the lieutenant who gave him
permission to conduct the roadblock are
politically accountable officials as contemplated in Sitz.™ The process by which the
roadblock was authorized also lacked features of political accountability that were
arguably present in Sitz: the Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to careful
advance study that included non-police public officials, while authority for this roadblock arose solely within a police agency.
Finally, there is no indication that the authorization process here involved any balancing of fourth amendment interests and
law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of the roadblock
in meeting those interests. Instead, the
lack of any written guidelines arising from
the authorization process strongly suggests that no such analysis took place.
The requirement of explicit guidelines,
developed in a politically accountable manner that includes balancing of the relevant
concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to
any judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless roadblock.11 After-the-fact judicial
balancing of the interests implicated by
9. While we understand that allowing large
trucks to bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safety's sake, we wonder about the
implications of this procedure for effective drug
interdiction. The procedure seems to invite
drug traffickers to transport their contraband in
large trucks, and possibly relatively massive
quantities, to avoid detection.

such a roadblock cannot make it constitutionally proper. Therefore, we hold that
the roadblock in which Sims was detained
violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Utah Constitution Article /, Section 1J>.
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines stresses the principle that when police
operations interfere with fourth amendment interests, "the discretion of the official in the field [must] be circumscribed, at
least to some extent." Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly places both guideline
development and the decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in the first place in
the hands of "politically accountable" officials. We view roadblock authorization
and guideline development as separate
steps, however. The initial decision to permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially
critical, and requires a higher degree of
political accountability than the guideline
development step. Sims argues that the
lack of statutory authority renders suspicionless roadblocks improper under the
blocks, again in contrast to the present situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated
plan developed by five District of Columbia police districts.

11. A similar conclusion might well be reached
by viewing the roadblock as an "administrative
search." Supreme Court cases dealing with
such searches have focused on the balance be10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d
tween the need for such searches and the fourth
1389 (10th Cir.1987), upholding the constitutionamendment values implicated by such searches.
ality of a roadblock for the purpose of checking
However, the cases also involved situations
driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insurwhere the challenged search was, at least arguance, pursuant only to the permission of a state
ably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See
police supervisor. Corral does not cite Browns
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
requirement, adopted in Sitz, of a plan explicitly
U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct 774, 25 UEd.2d 60 (1970) (fedlimiting officer discretion. In view of the reiteral statute); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
eration of that requirement we find in Sitz, we
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 LEd.2d 930 (1967)
do not accept Corral's implication that supervi(city housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387
sory permission to conduct a roadblock constiU.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967)
tutes an adequate "plan."
(city
building code).
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden,
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989), which, in turn,
was relied on by the trial court in holding the 12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other
federal cases should not be taken as approval of
roadblock in this case constitutional. McFayden
the analysis employed, or result reached, in
involved "traffic control" roadblocks set up to
these cases. We merely accede to the preemideal with traffic congestion associated with
nent position of the United States Supreme
street level drug trafficking. The McFayden
Court in construing the United States Constituroadblocks were found to pass the reasonabletion.
ness balancing test of Brown. Those road-
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Utah Constitution. As regards the initial
authority to permit such roadblocks, we
agree.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is virtually identical to the fourth
amendment like its federal counterpart,
it consists of a "reasonableness" clause
and a "warrant" clause:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying
the United States Supreme Court's "vacillation between the warrant approach and the
reasonableness approach11 regarding automobile searches, id at 469, reaffirmed its
commitment to the warrant approach under
our constitution, stating that "[warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470 (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984)).
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation of privacy in the interior of the subject
car, parked unattended and unlocked on a
public street, triggered the application of
article I, section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69.
Police officers' warrantless opening of the
car's door to view the vehicle identification
number on the doorjamb was found to constitute a search subject to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement The
search was then held improper under article I, section 14, because there was no
threat that the car would disappear before
13. Our analysis under the Utah Constitution is
limited to the need for legislative authorization.
We note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in Larocco, requires both probable cause
and exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search and seizure under article I, section
14, which would seem to prohibit this roadblock
and others. However, Larocco was a divided
decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring,
Justice Stewart concurring in result only, and
Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. The final

a warrant could be obtained to look inside
i t The court held that such "exigent circumstances,, to support a warrantless
search did not exist where the car was not
en route away from the officers' jurisdiction and the suspect had not been alerted to
police interest in it Id at 470-71.
Under article I, section 14 our supreme
court applies a "warrants whenever possible" policy to motor vehicle searches and
seizures. Id. This policy is consistent with
one fundamental purpose of constitutional
search and seizure limits: the interposition
of neutral authority between police seeking
evidence of crimes and the citizens from
whom such evidence is sought13
In the usual non-exigent circumstances
search and seizure scenario, the judicial
branch, through a magistrate, serves as
the neutral authority that issues or denies
a warrant to perform a search or seizure.
The warrant is issued only when probable
cause exists. U.S. Const amend. IV; Utah
Const, art I, § 14. Our state legislature,
however, has also served as a neutral authority between our police and our citizens,
in authorizing certain seizures upon less
than probable cause.
As already noted, our legislature has followed the courts' lead in authorizing brief
warrantless stops of individuals and motor
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14
Also as noted, the legislature has acted
independently in authorizing ports of entry,
as well as fish and game checkpoints.
These operations, supported by neither
warrants nor any level of individualized
suspicion, clearly implicate article I, section
14 of our constitution.
From an operational standpoint, ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely resemble the roadblock that was converdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, unknown.
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988)
may reflect a determination by our legislature
to not simply ratify judicial expansion of police
power by silent acquiescence, but to determine
through the political process whether such expansion is to become a part of Utah's law.
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ducted in this case, in that all large trucks, of authorization, it was entitled to no such
or all vehicles used by hunters, respective- presumption. Both warrants and statutes
ly, are submitted to official inspections. originate outside the executive branch,
However, in authorizing these operations, serving to check abuses of that branch's
our legislature has, presumably, weighed law enforcement power. Consistent with
the need for such suspicionless inspections our supreme court's emphasis on the waragainst their intrusion upon individual lib- rant requirement, then, we hold that suspierty,15 a process analogous to that per- cionless, investigatory motor vehicle roadformed by a magistrate in the issuance of a blocks, conducted without legislative authowarrant A high degree of political ac- rization, are per se unconstitutional under
countability for the institution of these article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitupractices can also be presumed, in that tion.
representatives of truckers, hunters, law
In requiring legislative authority as a
enforcement, and the citizenry at large all prerequisite to the use of suspicionless invery likely played a part in passing the
vestigatory roadblocks, we join two other
relevant statutes.
western states that have similarly conIn each case of legislation authorizing strued their constitutions. See, e.g.. State
specific types of checkpoints or stops of v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057
persons or vehicles, with or without individ- (1988); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97,
ualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the citi- 743 P.2d 692 (1987).16 At least one other
zens of this state have acted through their state has established the same standard
elected representatives. Therefore, the col- under the fourth amendment. State v.
lective will of the people is expressed and, Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.App.1984). This
furthermore, the people have notice of duly approach is particularly appropriate where
authorized police activity.
a proposed police practice will, as here,
In stark contrast, the roadblock conduct- affect everyone traveling our state's highed in this case was authorized solely by ways. Because of its close ties to the
police officers, the very people whose be- citizens whose rights will be affected, the
havior article I, section 14 is intended to minimum necessary political accountability
limit. No non-law enforcement officials for such practices lies, at the outset, with
took part in the decision to set up the our legislature.
roadblock. Leaving the initial decision to
Our holding that article I, section 14 proconduct such operations in police hands cre- hibits suspicionless investigative roadates a scheme that is both unrealistic and blocks without legislative authority, in efconstitutionally untenable.
fect, requires the legislature to perform the
[7] We believe that legislative authori- Sitz -type balancing function if and when it
zation of ports of entry and fish and game decides to consider the authorization of
checkpoints, like the issuance of a judicial such roadblocks. Judicial balancing of the
warrant, triggers at least some presump- interests implicated by such roadblocks,
tion that these law enforcement practices then, will need to occur only if and when
are constitutionally permissible. Because the legislature, upon performing such balthe roadblock in this case had neither form ancing itself, decides to authorize them.17
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these stops are exempted from stopping if
doing so would increase their one-way trip distance by more than three miles or five percent.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19.4(1) and (3) (Supp.
1990).

Island Supreme Court and the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional under their state constitutions without considering whether such practices could be
valid if statutorily authorized.

17. We note that the factors to be considered in
performing such balancing are myriad, complex, and subject to debate. See, eg., Sitz and
16. In Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 dissenting opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.;
(R.I.1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348
Nelson v. Lane County, 743 ?2d at 710-11 (apPa^uper. 306, 502 K2& 221 (1985), the Rhode
pendix); see also Davis & Wallentine, A Model
Utah Rep 803-809 P.2d—13
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We, unlike our colleague in his concurring
opinion, prefer that the legislature announce its view of public policy and the
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards
roadblocks, prior to the court applying constitutional analysis to the legislature's
product.18
We also emphasize that our holding on
the state constitutionality of the roadblock
in which Sims was stopped is limited in its
application to similar, non-emergency situations. It is not intended to apply to emergency roadblocks that might, for example,
be used to apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor
do we intend to impede any existing authority to conduct roadblocks for traffic
control purposes. Any constitutional challenge to these types of traffic stops awaits
another day. It is the suspicionless, investigative, non-emergency roadblock, conducted in the absence of legislative authority, that we hold to be unconstitutional.
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Sims argues that there was. insufficient
attenuation between his detention and the
consent he gave to search his vehicle to
purge the taint of the illegality of the detention. He does not claim that his consent
was coerced from him and was therefore
involuntary. Rather, he argues that because there were no intervening circumstances between the detention and the consent, the consent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and, therefore, evidence
seized pursuant to his consent should have
been ordered suppressed. Sims did not
make this argument in the trial court
[8,9] Normally, "where a defendant
fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in
the trial court, an appellate court will not
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.UJJPubJL 357
(1989). Political and economic considerations
that are the particular province of the legislature may also come into play: Utah's economy
benefits greatly from tourism, and the state is
also currently attempting to attract the Winter
Olympic Games. Our legislators may well wish
to consider the possible impact of suspicionless
roadblocks upon visitors to our state.

consider that ground on appeal." State v.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see
also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n. 2
(Utah CtApp.1990); Utah R.Crirn.P. 12.
Unless a ground for suppression is "unknown or unavailable1' to a defendant at
the time a suppression motion is filed, the
right to challenge the admission of evidence on that ground is waived. State v.
Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here,
however, because our then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced
search consent, by itself, purged the taint
of a primary illegality, Sims' non-attenuation argument was unavailable to him in
the trial court and would have been pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah CtApp.1988). Therefore, it is proper to address that argument
now.
In State t>. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing
this court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770
P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.App.1989), held
that, to be constitutionally valid, a search
consent following illegal police behavior
must be both non-coerced and not arrived
at by exploitation of the primary police
illegality. Factors used to evaluate the
non-exploitation or attenuation element are
derived from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975),
which involved a confession obtained from
a criminal suspect after his illegal arrest.
They include the temporal proximity of the
primary illegality and the granting of consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (citing
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct at
2261-62, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)).
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our
automobiles than in other states or in the United States Supreme Court's enunciation of the
"automobile exception" under the fourth
amendment. See California v. Carney, 471 VS.
386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).
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[10] The Arroyo case was remanded to
the trial court for fact finding on the issue
of whether the defendant's consent to
search his vehicle was attenuated from or
an exploitation of his illegal stop. Because
the burden is on the State to show that
evidence obtained following illegal police
conduct is attenuated from the illegality,
Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262,
and because the attenuation issue was not
presented to the trial court, a remand to
examine the attenuation factors has been
suggested here. We find, however, that
the record now before us contains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us to determine the issue as a matter of law. See id.
Regarding the temporal proximity factor,
the record demonstrates a very short time
span between Sims' stop in the roadblock
and Trooper Howard's request to search
his automobile. The trooper had but a
brief conversation with Sims, regarding his
license and registration, his trip itinerary,
and possession of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking for consent to search
his car. The consent was obtained within
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even
under our clear error standard of review
could the trial court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent to
attenuate the relationship between the
two.19
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of intervening circumstances between
the illegal stop and Sims' grant of consent
to the search. Such circumstances must be
independent of the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Here, Trooper
Howard's request for consent to search
Sims' sedan was based upon the smell of
alcohol, the sight of the open liquor bottle
in the sedan, and Sims' admission, uneventful since the bottle was in obvious
view, that he was carrying alcohol. Howard's opportunity to make these observa19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less
than two hours between an illegal arrest and the
obtaining of an incriminating statement from
the arrestee was viewed as insufficient to attenuate the statement from the arrest. 422 US. at
604, 95 S.O. at 2262.
20. Additionally. Trooper Howard testified that,
once the open container was discovered, Sims

tions and to question Sims, however, depended entirely on the illegal roadblock.
Neither Sims' driving nor the external appearance of his vehicle justified stopping
him. Nothing occurred which could have
reasonably made him feel free to proceed
on his journey at any time between the
moment of his stop and the discoveries that
prompted the tro?:>*r's request for consent
to search his vehicle.20 Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his consent, but gave it
only when asked. Sims' consent, then,
arose from an unbroken chain of events
that began with the illegal roadblock.
The final factor in the attenuation analysis is an examination of the purpose and
flagrancy of the primary police illegality.
Here, this factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated to the question of whether
a search consent flowed from, i.e., was an
exploitation of, the illegal police conduct21
Instead, it appears to be an alternative
approach, inviting us to overlook unconstitutional police conduct that serves good
purposes and is not too flagrant.
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified at some length about their expertise in
drug interdiction, and the trial court treated the roadblock as if that was its primary
purpose. However noble this purpose
might be, it was pursued by an unauthorized means. The troopers each had years
of law enforcement experience, and can
properly be charged with awareness that
their action was not authorized by law.
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 573, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to
twelve law officers to staff the roadblock
may have also left distant parts of the
largely rural jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the event of need. Thus,
was, in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to
citation and to field sobriety testing.
21. By contrast, in Brvwn v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest,
that appeared "calculated to cause surprise,
fright, and confusion/' 422 US. at 605, 95 S.Ct.
at 2262, as a causative factor producing the
arrestee's subsequent incriminating statements.
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although it does not appear that the officers behaved abusively toward those
stopped at the roadblock, this does not correct the constitutional violation.
In sum, the record demonstrates that
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was
arrived at by exploitation of the illegal
roadblock. Accordingly, that consent was
invalid. Because the exclusionary rule applies to violations of both the fourth
amendment and article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidence
obtained under that consent must be suppressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE TO
CONTINUE SEARCH
Troopers Howard and Mangelson believed that the discovery of marijuana in
Sims' sedan under the consent search gave
them probable cause to continue searching
after consent was withdrawn. However,
because the initial consent was invalid, any
probable cause found while searching under that consent was also invalid. Absent
probable cause to search the sedan without
Sims' consent, we need not reach the issue
of whether exigent circumstances existed
to make the warrant requirement inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
Sims' conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court for proceedings in accord with
this opinion.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (coacvurring specially)-.
While I otherwise concur fully in the
court's opinion, I have two difficulties with
the discussion treating the roadblock under
article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if the roadblock cannot even be
validated under the questionable "balancing" approach of Michigan v. Sitz, —U.S.
, 110 S.Ct 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412
(1990), see, e.g.t id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), we have no need to examine

whether it might be additionally invalid under the state constitution. Second, and
more importantly, I am not enthusiastic
about suggesting that the legislature, any
more than the courts or the police, should
be about the business of balancing away
important constitutional protections that
safeguard all of us so that law enforcement can more readily catch an occasional
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free
from police intrusion in the total absence of
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing
should simply not be at the mercy of the
legislature's determination of how tourism
or our hopes for the Olympics might somehow be adversely impacted by one law enforcement technique or another.
If it were necessary to reach the state
constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the
roadblock passed muster under the federal
constitution, I would be more inclined to
solidify long-standing constitutional precepts as at the core of article I, section 14,
than to borrow the troublesome "balancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt
some variation of that approach, and begin
a journey down that nebulous path. Cf.
State v, Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah
1990) (state constitutional analysis employed "to simplify ... the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily
followed by the police and the courts and,
at the same time, provide the public with
consistent and predictable protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures"). I would probably prefer to hold
that the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), uniformly applied by Utah courts, is a matter
of Utah constitutional law that simply may
not be balanced away by any branch of our
government and that is not amenable to a
roadblock exception.
Under established Utah decisional law, in
the absence of any individualized suspicion,
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g.,
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah
CtApp.1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d
537, 570 (Utah CtApp.1990); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah CtApp.
1987). A level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter. Id And one does not lose
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the right to decline to participate in a level
one encounter simply because one chooses
to drive rather than to walk. See State v.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah CtApp.
1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328
(Utah CtApp.1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). See
also, Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648,
663, 99 S.Ct 1391, 1401, 59 LEd.2d 660
(1979) (persons do not lose the protections
of fourth amendment "when they step
from the sidewalk into their automobiles");
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491, 494
(Utah CtApp.1990).
If, as seems clear, the police cannot require every pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to stop and answer police inquiries, I
am hard-pressed to see how they can stop
every car on a stretch of the interstate
highway and require the driver to answer
inquiries. In my view, the only roadblock
that is sure to pass state constitutional
muster is one which would qualify as a
level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock
or otherwise refusing to cooperate not detained). I see no constitutional problem
with a roadside police checkpoint announced by a sign on the freeway, "Police
Roadblock Next Exit Your Cooperation in
Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated."
Most drivers would stop, even though they
could not be required to, just as most pedestrians will stop and respond to police
inquiries on the sidewalk. But on neither
medium of travel can one suspected of
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to
do so.
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Worker's petition to withdraw his retirement application was denied by the
State Retirement Board, and worker appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J.,
held that: (1) worker's request to cancel his
application was untimely, and (2) Board had
no affirmative duty to inform worker of
proposed legislation which, if passed, could
substantially affect his benefits.
Affirmed.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=>800
Standard of review on appeal from final agency action dealing with statutory
interpretation presents issue of law, and
Court of Appeals therefore applies correction-of-error standard, in which it extends
no deference to agency's conclusions.
2. States *=»64.1(3)
Where worker established on his retirement application his retirement date,
which date also determined when his benefits would start to accrue, no alteration,
addition, or cancellation of his benefits
could be made after that date; thus, because his request to cancel his application
was not made until after that date, his
request was properly refused. U.C.A.1953,
49-1-603(1).
3. States *»64.1(3)
Retirement Board had no affirmative
duty to inform worker, who had filed his
retirement application, of proposed legislation which, if passed, could substantially
affect his benefits. U.C.A.1953, 49-1603(1).

